At the centre of modern epistemology lurks the problem of scepticism: how can we know that the forms of our cognition are compatible with the world? How can we state success conditions for knowledge claims without somehow transcending our discursive and fallible nature as knowers?

By distinguishing different forms of scepticism, Markus Gabriel shows how all objective knowledge relies on shared discourses and how the essential corrigibility of knowledge claims is a crucial condition of their objectivity. We should understand scepticism not so much as posing a threat, but as offering a vital lesson about the fallibility of discursive thinking. By heeding this lesson, we can begin to reintegrate the solipsistic subject of modern epistemology back into the community of actual knowers.

Taking his cue from Hegel, Wittgenstein and Brandom, Gabriel shows how intentionality as such is a public rather than a private phenomenon. He concedes that the sceptic can prove the necessary finitude of objective knowledge, but denies that this has to lead us into an aporia. Instead, it shows us the limits of the modern project of epistemology.

Through an examination of different kinds of sceptical paradoxes, Gabriel not only demonstrates their indispensable role within epistemological theorising, but also argues for the necessary failure of all totalizing knowledge claims. In this way, epistemology, as the discipline that claims knowledge about knowledge, begins to grasp its own fallibility and, as a result, the true nature of its objectivity.

The Limits of Epistemology will be of great value to students and scholars of philosophy.

Markus Gabriel was born in 1980 and studied in Heidelberg, Lisbon and New York. Since 2009 he has held the Chair for Epistemology at the University of Bonnand with this appointment he became Germanys youngest philosophy professor. He is also the director of the International Center for Philosophy in Bonn.

Preface to the English Edition
Introduction
Part I               The Function of Scepticism
Chapter 1 Negative Dogmatism and Methodological Scepticism
Chapter 2 Kants Negative Dogmatism
Chapter 3 Metaphysical Realism and the Naïve Ontology of Individuals
Chapter 4 Conceptual Relativity and the World
Chapter 5 Direct and Indirect Sceptical Arguments: The Path to Semantic Nihilism
Chapter 6 Crispin Wrights Implosion of Cartesian Scepticism and its Dialectic
Part II              Contextualism and the Finitude of Discourse

Chapter 7 Pyrrhonian Scepticism as the Agent of Epistemology
Chapter 8 Contextualism, Normativity and the Possibility of Discursive Determinacy
Chapter 9 Private Language and Assertoric Content
Chapter 10 The Diametrical Opposite of Solipsism
Chapter 11 McDowells Disjunctivism as an Anti-Sceptical Strategy
Chapter 12 Stage-Setting and Discourse: The Community in Context
Chapter 13 Solipsisms Representations and Cartesian Scepticism
Chapter 14 The Failure of Liberal Naturalisms Metatheory
Chapter 15 A Final Attempt to Recover the World: Brandom with Hegel

Notes
Bibliography